

UNCLASSIFIED

Z45

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN PART
1.4(B)PAGE 01 KIGALI 01710 01 OF 03 060921Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	EAP-01	EB-01	EUR-01
	EXIM-01	OIGO-01	E-00	FRB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-16	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-01	PM-00
	PRS-01	P-01	SB-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	FMP-00
	SNIS-00	NISC-02	PMB-00	PRM-10	DRL-09	G-00	/065W

-----7A4B30 060923Z /38

R 060636Z OCT 94
 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
 TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
 AMEMBASSY TUNIS
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
 AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 AMEMBASSY ACCRA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 SECSTATE WASHDC 0163
 AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
 USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 001710

USUN NEW YORK FOR DONLON

PARIS FOR MORAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 01710 01 OF 03 060921Z

LONDON FOR MCKINLEY

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PGOV, PREF, EFIN, EAID

SUBJECT: SHESTACK MEETING WITH U.N OFFICIALS

1. (U) SUMMARY. USUN AFRICAN ADVISER LAURIE
 SHESTACK MET WITH [REDACTED]

1.4(B)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[] DISCUSSIONS RAN THE GAUNTLET OF 1.4(B)
U.N. RWANDA ISSUES, INCLUDING WHAT U.N. OFFICIALS ON
THE GROUND SEE AS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE U.S. ROLE.
END SUMMARY.

ROMAN URASA -- UNHCR

2. (C) IN A BRIEF MEETING, [] TOLD SHESTACK THAT 1.4(B)
"A LOT OF FENCE-MENDING" WAS NEEDED WITH THE GOR IN
THE WAKE OF THE FLAP OVER THE GERSONY REPORT. HE
DEFENDED UNHCR'S REPATRIATION POLICY, SAYING THEY
HAD STOPPED ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING REPATRIATION FROM
THE CAMPS SINCE RETURNEES HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN
KILLED. HOWEVER, UNHCR CONTINUED TO ASSIST THOSE
WHO DID CROSS THE BORDER TO RETURN TO AREAS UNHCR
DEEMS SAFE (I.E., THOSE WHERE MILOBS ARE PRESENT).

3. (C) HE ADMITTED THAT UNHCR PERSONNEL HAD
SUFFERED HARASSMENT IN THE WAKE OF THE GERSONY
REPORT, INCLUDING INTRUSIVE INSPECTIONS. UNHCR HAD
PULLED THREE STAFF MEMBERS OUT OF KIBUNGO FOR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 01710 01 OF 03 060921Z
SECURITY REASONS. HOWEVER, THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
HAD INSTRUCTED PREFECTS THIS WEEK THAT THE GOR WOULD
CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH UNHCR, AND THE STAFF HAS
SUBSEQUENTLY ENCOUNTERED FEWER PROBLEMS. [] SAID 1.4(B)
THAT UNAMIR -- PARTICULARLY TOUSIGNANT -- HAD
COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH UNHCR ON PROTECTION CONCERNS
SINCE THE REPORT SURFACED.

4. (C) IN A FOLLOWING ASIDE TO A/DCM, [] WAS 1.4(B)
SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE REPORT. HE SAID THAT FIELD
OBSERVATION DID NOT BEAR OUT GERSONY'S CONCLUSION
AND LAMENTED THE FASHION IN WHICH THE REPORT HAD
INITIALLY BEEN RELEASED

[] 1.4(B)

5. (C) [] WAS EQUALLY CANDID TO SHESTACK ON WHAT 1.4(B)
HE TERMED "THE UNFORTUNATE" REPORT, WHICH HE HAD
RECEIVED AND READ IN AN UNATTRIBUTED FORM ON OCTOBER
4. HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO PRESIDENT
BIZIMUNGU, WHO WAS "FURIOUS". HB EXPRESSED
PUZZLEMENT AT THE UNHCR'S "SELF-PLAGELLATION" AND
SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE CONCLUSIONS, WHICH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NEEDED CROSS-CHECKING. HE OBJECTED TO BOTH THE MEANS IN WHICH THE REPORT HAD SURFACED AS WELL AS THE INACCURACY OF ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE GOR WAS BEHIND THE SYSTEMATIC KILLING OF HUTUS.

5. HE CITED ONE SPECIFIC EXAMPLE, HIS VISIT TO AN UNSPECIFIED VILLAGE IN SECTOR 5 WHERE GERSONY HAD REPORTED THE RECENT EXECUTION OF HUTUS BY TUTSIS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KIGALI 01710 01 OF 03 060921Z
HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH AUSTRALIANS WORKING THERE REVEALED THAT 80 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION HAD RETURNED; THEY WERE LIVING IN HARMONY WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THE AUSTRALIANS SAID THAT THE MASSACRE IN QUESTION HAD BEEN PERPETRATED BY A HUTU EXTREMIST WHO HELD ON AS MAYOR AFTER THE FORMER GOVERNMENT'S FALL. HE AND HIS BAND OF FOLLOWERS HAD COMMITTED SEVERAL ATROCITIES IN LATE JULY, INCLUDING MURDER. THE LEADER HAD ULTIMATELY FLED TO ZAIRE; SEVEN OF HIS FOLLOWERS WERE CAPTURED. [REDACTED] THEY HAD BEEN IMPRISONED AND THEIR NAMES GIVEN TO ICRC. A PRISON VISIT HAD FOUND THEM IN GOOD SHAPE. HIS CONCLUSION: THE REPORT WAS AS BEST QUESTIONABLE.

1.4(B)

6. IF THIS WERE THE BAD NEWS, HB SAID, THE GOOD NEWS WAS THE REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS (UNHRC). HE FELT THAT IT WOULD REASSURE THE GOR. WHICH FELT THAT THE UNHCR WAS AGAINST IT.

7. BACK TO BAD NEWS, HE NOTED THAT THE EMERGING VIBRANT PRIVATE SECTOR WAS HOSTAGE TO THE MORIBUND GOVERNMENT SECTOR. THE PROBLEM WAS MONEY: DESPITE MANY PLEDGES OF FUTURE AID, THE GOR HAD RECEIVED NO SHORT-TERM SUPPORT. HE OBSERVED THAT GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 01710 02 OF 03 060921Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	EAP-01	EB-01	EUR-01
	EXIM-01	OIGO-01	E-00	FRB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-16	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-01	PM-00
	PRS-01	P-01	SB-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	FMP-00
	SNIS-00	NISC-02	PMB-00	PRM-10	DRL-09	G-00	/065W

-----7A4B49 060923Z /38

R 060636Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SECSTATE WASHDC 0164
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 001710

USUN NEW YORK FOR DONLON

PARIS FOR MORAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 01710 02 OF 03 060921Z

LONDON FOR MCKINLEY

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PGOV, PREF, EFIN, EAID
SUBJECT: SHESTACK MEETING WITH U.N OFFICIALS

MINISTRIES WERE ALREADY SUFFERING ABSENTEEISM AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THAT THE UNPAID ARMY POSED AN EVERY GROWING RISK.

8. [] PRAISED GOR/UNAMIR COOPERATION IN THE
INTEGRATION OF ZONE 4, WHERE HE SAID THERE HAD NOT
BEEN A SINGLE INCIDENT. HE NOTED THAT, AT UNAMIR'S
SUGGESTION AND DESPITE THE GOR'S UNDERSTANDABLE
IMPATIENCE, THE RPA DID NOT DEPLOY A SINGLE SOLIDER
INTO THE ZONE FOR FOUR WEEKS, UNTIL THE POPULATION
HAD BEEN REASONABLY ASSURED. 1.4(B)

9. [] ADDRESSED THE CAMPS IN ZAIRE, NOTING THAT
KENGO SEEMED INTENT ON SEPARATING THE ARMY,
INTERHAMWE/POLITICAL LEADERS, AND NEUTRALS INTO
SEPARATE CAMP. A UNAMIR ASSESSMENT TEAM WAS IN
ZAIRE LOOKING AT CAPITAL, LOGISTIC, AND RECURRENT
COSTS FOR SUCH AN OPERATION, WHICH HE EXPECTED THE
GOZ TO TRY AND INFLATE. HE RHETORICALLY ASKED WHO
WOULD PAY? 1.4(B)

10. HE STRESSED THAT SEPARATION WOULD BE
DIFFICULT. CONTROL OF THE CAMPS WAS THE LAST
POLITICAL CARD OF THE HARDLINERS, WHO OTHERWISE HAD
ONLY BLUSTER ABOUT AN IMMINENT INVASION LEFT IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 01710 02 OF 03 060921Z
THEIR QUIVER. HE FELT THAT A "SHORT, SHARP" CHAPTER
7 OPERATION OF 3-6 MONTHS DURATION WAS THE ONLY
SOLUTION, AND HE FEARED THAT IT WOULD BE VIOLENT.
HE STRESSED THAT GOZ INVOLVEMENT WAS ESSENTIAL BUT
SHOULD BE MINIMAL, SINCE GOZ LEADERSHIP WOULD BE A
RECIPE FOR DISASTER.

11. [] SAW THE REINTEGRATION OF THE
TWO COMPETING MILITARIES -- AFTER ADEQUATE SCREENING
-- AS THE ONLY TRUE BEGINNING OF RECONCILIATION. IN
HIS VIEW, THE MILITIA WERE CRIMINALS AND WOULD NEVER
COME BACK. SINCE THE EX-FAR PROVIDED THE BACKBONE
OF THE MILITIA IN THE CAMPS, HE THOUGHT ITS REMOVAL
WOULD DEMORALIZE THE INTERHAMWE. (COMMENT. THE
LACK OF EX-FAR IN TANZANIAN CAMPS HAS NOT PREVENTED
THE EXTREMIST LEADERSHIP AND MILITIAS FROM TAKING
CHARGE THERE. END COMMENT.) 1.4(B)

12. [] CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT THE
BEST THING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD DO WAS
PROVIDE USD 30 MILLION FOR THE BASIC FUNCTIONING OF 1.4(B)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE GOR. HE FELT THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO DO THEIR BEST AND HAD MADE GREAT PROGRESS; IT WOULD BE A PITY TO ABANDON THEM TO THE DESCENDING CYCLE OF MILITARY ABUSE, PREDATORY ECONOMIC PRACTICES, AND CRIMINALITY THAT HAD EVOLVED IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR CHAOS OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. HE WRONGLY OBSERVED THAT HE MET WITH SEVERAL FOREIGN MINISTERIAL LEVEL DELEGATIONS EACH WEEK, BUT THAT FEW CONCRETE RESOURCES HAD MATERIALIZED FROM THE TALKS.

(SHESTACK COMMENT: USUN MAY WISH TO ECHO [REDACTED])

1.4(B)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KIGALI 01710 02 OF 03 060921Z
POINT ABOUT THE NEED TO GET THE GOVERNMENT
FUNCTIONING DURING THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION
OF THE SYG'S REPORT ON RWANDA OF OCTOBER 9. END
COMMENT.)

[REDACTED]

1.4(B)

13. [REDACTED] MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE SHARED [REDACTED]
POLITICAL ANALYSIS. ON THE MILITARY LEVEL, RWANDA
WAS CALM. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE LESS SECURITY
INCIDENTS THAN IN MANY NORTH AMERICAN CITIES AND
THAT AREA 2 WAS OF NO MORE CONCERN THAN THE OTHERS.
ON THE GREEN-YELLOW-RED SPECTRUM (CALM, DANGEROUS,
VERY DANGEROUS), ONLY CYANGUGU WAS YELLOW. HE
DISMISSED OUT OF HAND THE ACCURACY OF THE GERSONY
REPORT.

1.4(B)
1.4(B)

14. [REDACTED] SAID THAT GOR PROCEDURES HAD SLOWED
DP AND REFUGEE RETURN, SINCE LOCAL AUTHORITIES
WANTED TO KNOW EXACTLY WHO WAS COMING BACK. HE SAID
THAT THERE WERE 10 OR 12 ARRESTS PER WEEK AND THAT
THE ICRC WAS INFORMED OF ALL ARREST CASES.
(COMMENT. WE WILL REPORT SEPTTEL THE SOMEWHAT
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE OF THE ICRC REP. END

1.4(B)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KIGALI 01710 03 OF 03 060921Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	ARA-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00
	CTME-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	EAP-01	EB-01	EUR-01
	EXIM-01	OIGO-01	E-00	FRB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-16	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-01	PM-00
	PRS-01	P-01	SB-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	FMP-00
	SNIS-00	NISC-02	PMB-00	PRM-10	DRL-09	G-00	/065W

-----7A4B59 060924Z /38

R 060636Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SECSTATE WASHDC 0165
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 KIGALI 001710

USUN NEW YORK FOR DONLON

PARIS FOR MORAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KIGALI 01710 03 OF 03 060921Z

LONDON FOR MCKINLEY

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PGOV, PREF, EFIN, EAID
SUBJECT: SHESTACK MEETING WITH U.N OFFICIALS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMENT.)

15. [REDACTED] HE 1.4(B)
WAS STILL AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF THE TUNISIANS, WHO
NOW PLANNED TO DEPLOY ON OCTOBER 6, 11, AND 15. HE
OBSERVED THAT THE DEPARTURE OF GEN. GERALD HAD
EFFECTIVELY ENDED U.S. AIRLIFT SUPPORT, INCLUDING
SEVERAL REFRIGERATION UNITS THAT WERE TO HAVE BEEN
DELIVERED IN LATE AUGUST. HE EXPRESSED IMPATIENCE
WITH THE TARDY ZAMBIAN DEPLOYMENT. THE ZAMBIANS
WERE TO HAVE RELIEVED THE GHANAIS -- WHO BORE THE
BRUNT OF THE KIGALI CONFLICT -- IN THE SOUTHWEST FOR
REDEPLOYMENT TO THE SOUTHEAST. HE PRAISED THE
PROFESSIONALISM OF THE MALAWI CONTINGENT, WHICH HE
DESCRIBED AS PROFESSIONAL, POSITIVE, UNDEMANDING,
AND SELF-SUFFICIENT, ONCE ITS FOU-FOU MILL WAS IN
PLACE.

16. [REDACTED] DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS 1.4(B)
SUFFICIENT COHESION IN EX-FAR LEADERSHIP IN ZAIRE TO
ORGANIZE A SERIOUS INVASION OF RWANDA. IN HIS VIEW,
THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE MILITARY IN THE CAMPS --
WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY POSE A PROBLEM -- WAS A
SEPARATE PKO TO REMOVE EX-FAR TO OTHER CAMPS.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KIGALI 01710 03 OF 03 060921Z
UNAMIR HAD NO CREDIBILITY WITH THOSE IN THE CAMPS,
WHICH COULD ONLY EXACERBATE THE DIFFICULTIES OF AN
EXPANDED UNAMIR OPERATION INTO ZAIRE. HE SAID THAT
HE HAD NONETHELESS DRAWN UP CONTINGENCY PLANS.

17. HE FLATLY STATED THAT THERE WAS NO EASY
SOLUTION TO THE CAMPS. IF ONE EXISTED, UNAMIR WOULD
ALREADY HAVE PROPOSED AND ORGANIZED IT. HE
SPECULATED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE THE ONLY COUNTRY
WILLING TO ENGAGE IN AN OPERATION THAT WOULD
CERTAINLY BE VIOLENT. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT
REINTEGRATION OF ACCEPTABLE EX-FAR ELEMENTS INTO THE
RPA WOULD CONSTITUTE A SEVERE BLOW TO THE EXTREMIST
LEADERSHIP IN THE CAMPS.

18. SHESTACK CLEARED THIS MESSAGE BEFORE DEPARTING
POST.

WHITEHEAD

UNCLASSIFIED